The evidential conditional by Vincenzo, Crupi & Andrea, Iacona
The Evidential Conditional
vincenzo, crupi , andrea iacona
October 16, 2019
This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which
rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports
its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some
distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one
hand, it departs from the material reading of ‘if then’ exactly in the way
we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly
differs from the non-material reading of ‘if then’ implied by the suppositional
theories advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others.
1 overview
Logicians have always been tempted by the thought that ‘if then’ expresses a
relation of support. The meaning of ‘support’ can be articulated in various
ways by using everyday words: one is to say that the antecedent of a con-
ditional must provide a reason to accept its consequent, so that the latter is
justifiedly inferred from the former; another is to say that, if the consequent
of a conditional holds, it must hold in virtue of its antecedent, or because its
antecedent holds. What makes this thought intuitively appealing is that, in
most cases, conditionals can indeed be paraphrased by using such words.
Here are some examples:
(1) If it’s pure cashmere, it will not shrink
(2) If you drink a beer, you’ll feel better
(3) If it is snowing, then it is cold
It seems correct to say that the antecedent of (1) provides a reason to accept
its consequent, and that if the consequent of (1) holds, it holds in virtue of its
antecedent. Accordingly, the following reformulations of (1) seem acceptable:
(4) If it’s pure cashmere, we can infer that it will not shrink
(5) If it will not shrink, it’s because it’s pure cashmere
Similar considerations hold for (2) and (3). What one wants to say when one
utters (2) is that drinking a beer makes you feel better, so that if you drink it,
you’ll experience that effect. In the case of (3), again, the antecedent provides
a reason to accept the consequent. Although in this case the event described
by the antecedent does not cause the event described by the consequent, the
consequent clearly depends on the antecedent is some explanatory sense.
Of course, there are cases in which no paraphrase in terms of ‘reason’,
‘infer’, ‘in virtue of’, or ‘because’ is available. Typically, concessive condi-
tionals do not admit reformulations along the lines suggested. Suppose that
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we intend to go out for a walk and we hope that it will be sunny. We can
nonetheless assert what follows:
(6) If it will rain, we will go
In this case it would be inappropriate to say that the rain provides a reason
to go, or that if we will go, it is because it will rain. Instead, what we mean
by uttering (6) is that we will go anyway, that is, in spite of the rain. So the
following seem correct reformulations of (6):
(7) Even if it will rain, we will go
(8) If it will rain, we will still go
More generally, concessive conditionals are suitably phrased by using ‘even
if’ or ‘still’, and do not imply support in the sense considered.
However, the range of cases in which the notion of support seems perti-
nent is sufficiently large and representative to deserve separate study. Despite
the plain intelligibility of paraphrases such (4) and (5), the notion of support
proves hard to capture at the formal level. This explains the heterogeneity
and the multiplicity of the attempts that have been made so far to define a
connective with the property desired. At least two main lines of thought
have been explored. One option is to treat conditionals as strict conditionals
and define support in terms of necessitation: a conditional is true just in case
its antecedent necessitates its consequent1. Another option is to provide a
non-monotonic formal treatment of conditionals which somehow captures
the intuition of support2. The account that will be outlined here belongs
to the second category, even though it significantly differs from its main
exponents.
We will call ‘evidential’ the interpretation of ‘if then’ that our account is
intended to capture, and accordingly we will call ‘evidential’ the account
itself. The evidential interpretation may be regarded as one coherent reading
of ‘if then’, although it is not necessarily the only admissible reading. We
will not address the thorny question of whether there is a unique correct
analysis of ‘if then’, because the main points that we will make can be
acknowledged without assuming that an affirmative answer can be given
to that question. If different readings of ‘if then’ are equally admissible, the
evidential interpretation is one of them.
Interestingly, the notion of support seems to apply equally well to in-
dicative conditionals and to counterfactuals. Although we will focus on
indicative conditionals, what we will say about this notion can easily be
extended to counterfactuals. In particular, the distinction between evidential
and concessive readings of ‘if then’ is orthogonal to the distinction between
indicative and subjunctive conditionals. For example, the following sentences
exhibit the same difference that obtains between (1) and (6):
(9) If it were cashmere, it would not shrink
(10) If it were raining, we would go
1 This option has been developed in different ways by Lycan [23], Gillies [13], Kratzer [20], Iacona
[15], and others.
2 Among the most recent attempts, Rott [27] contains a pioneering discussion of ‘if’ and ‘because’,
relying on a variation of the belief revision formalism. The ranking-theoretic account offered
in Spohn [30] explicitly involves the idea of the antecedent as providing a reason for the
consequent. The approach to conditionals outlined in Douven [8] and Douven [9] employs the
notion of evidential support from Bayesian epistemology. K. Krzyzanowska, S. Wenmackers,
and I. Douven [17] and R. van Rooij and K. Schulz [33] provide further examples.
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While (9) can be paraphrased by means of sentences that resemble (4) and
(5), the most appropriate reformulations of (10) are sentences that resemble
(7) and (8).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a first informal
sketch of the evidential account. Section 3 introduces a modal language that
includes the symbol ., which represents our reading of ‘if then’3. Sections
4-8 spell out some important logical properties of .. Section 9 explains
how . differs from the suppositional conditional as understood by Adams,
Stalnaker, Lewis, and others. Finally, section 10 points out that the evidential
interpretation can also be framed in terms of assertibility.
2 the core idea
The intuition that underlies the evidential account is very straightforward.
Let ‘If A, then C’ be any conditional. The following table displays the four
combinations of values that A and C can take:
1 1 X
1 0 ×
0 1 X
0 0 X
According to the material reading of ‘if then’, one of these four combinations
is bad, 10, while the others are good, 11, 01, 00. The badness of 10 is
understood as follows: if 10 is actually realized, that is, if A is true and C is
false, then ‘If A, then C’ is false, otherwise it is true.
Yet there is another way of looking at the same table, that is, there is
another way of seeing 10 as the bad combination. Instead of understanding
its badness as the claim that 10 must not actually occur, one can understand
it as the claim that 10 must not be likely to occur. To illustrate, consider
(2). According to the reading of the table we are suggesting, (2) is true just
in case the combination 10 is not likely to occur, that is, it is not likely that
you drink a beer without feeling better. Otherwise, (2) is false. We take this
reading to be very plausible. Or at least, it is definitely no less plausible than
the reading according to which the truth or falsity of (2) depends on whether
you actually drink a beer, or whether you actually feel better.
What does it mean that the combination 10 is not likely to occur? It means
that the worlds in which it occurs — the 10-worlds — are distant from the
actual world if compared with those in which it does not occur. For example,
the following diagram describes a case in which (2) is true:
— — — 11
— — — — — — 10
01
— — 00
Here the length of each dashed line indicates the distance from the actual
world of the closest world in which the respective combination occurs. That
is, any world in which you drink a beer without feeling better is more distant
3 This symbol is borrowed from Spohn [30].
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from the actual world than some world in which this does not happen. The
following diagram, instead, describes a case in which (2) is false:
— — — — — — 11
— — — 10
01
— — 00
In this case the closest world in which you drink a beer without feeling better
is less distant from the actual world than the closest world in which you
drink a beer and feel better.
In other words, the second reading of the table is modal rather than
material, as it concerns what happens in a set of worlds that may differ in
several respects from the actual world. The contrast between materiality
and modality is a fundamental point of dispute that emerged from the very
beginning of the debate on conditionals. According to Sextus Empiricus, the
Stoics disagreed with each other on at least two views of conditionals. One
of them was attributed to Philo:
a true conditional is one which does not have a true antecedent
and a false consequent4
The other was attributed to Chrysippus:
a conditional holds whenever the denial of its consequent is
incompatible with its antecedent5
Chrysippus’ view can be construed in different ways, because incompatibil-
ity can be understood in different ways. The account just sketched may be
regarded as one of them: to say that the denial of the consequent is incom-
patible with the antecedent is to say that the worlds in which the antecedent
and the negation of the consequent are both true are distant from the actual
world6.
In order to provide a perspicuous representation of comparative measures
of distance, we will employ Lewis’s system of spheres. We will imagine
non-actual worlds as ordered in a set of spheres around the actual world,
depending on their degree of similarity to the actual world. In this framework,
to say that 10 is not likely to be realized is to say that some sufficiently
inclusive sphere is 10-free, that is, it contains no 10-worlds7.
The qualification ‘sufficiently inclusive’ is intended to rule out two cases:
one is that in which the sphere contains no world where the antecedent
is true, the other is that in which the sphere contains no world where the
consequent is false. In each of these two cases, the sphere is 10-free solely in
virtue of the modal status of one of the two constituents of the conditional —
the unlikeliness of A or the likeliness of C — independently of its relation
with the other. To give substance to the idea that A supports C, we will
require that there is a 10-free sphere in which A is true in some world and C
is false in some world.
These two further conditions guarantee the connection between A and C
in the following sense. First, if there is a 10-free sphere in which A is true
4 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, II, 110-12.
5 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, II, 110-12.
6 This reading of Chrysippus’s view differs from a stronger reading that is sometimes adopted,
as in Sanford [29], p. 25, namely that a conditional is true when there are no worlds in which
the antecedent and the negation of the consequent are both true.
7 Lewis [22], pp. 13-19.
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in some world, then some 11-worlds are closer to the actual world than any
10-world. This is essentially the Ramsey Test as understood by Stalnaker
and Lewis: in the closest world (or worlds) in which A is true, C must be
true as well8. Second, if there is a 10-free sphere in which C is false in some
world, then some 00-worlds are closer to the actual world than any 10-world.
This amounts to a different test, call it the Chrysippus Test: the falsity of
C must make the falsity of A more likely than its truth. The Chrysippus
Test characterizes the evidential interpretation as we understand it, for it
accounts for the intuition that if C holds, it holds in virtue of A. If this test
fails, then the closest 10-world may well be distant, but not more than the
closest 00-world. Thus, even if the falsity of C is kept away from the actual
world, it is not because of the truth of A.
Consider again (2). The first of the two diagrams above describes a case in
which (2) is true. In that case there is a 10-free sphere in which the antecedent
is true in some world and the consequent is false in some world. Instead, the
second diagram describes a case in which (2) is false. In that case there is no
10-free sphere in which the antecedent is true in some world, although there
is some 10-sphere, so the Ramsey Test fails. There are worlds in which you
drink a beer, and the closest worlds in which you drink a beer are worlds in
which you don’t feel better. In order to show a violation of the Chrysippus
Test we need a different diagram:
— — 11
— — — 10
01
— — — — 00
In this case (2) is false because there is no 10-free sphere in which the
consequent is false in some world, although there is some 10-free sphere.
The problem is that the closest worlds in which you don’t feel better are
worlds in which you drink a beer rather than being worlds in which you
don’t drink a beer. This implies that if you feel better, it is not because of the
beer.
The role of the Chrysippus Test emerges clearly when we consider exam-
ples such as the following:
(11) If you drink a beer, the sun will rise tomorrow
(11) passes the Ramsey Test: the closest worlds in which you drink a beer
are worlds in which the sun will rise tomorrow. But it does not pass the
Chrysippus Test: it is not the case that the closest worlds in which the sun
will not rise tomorrow are worlds in which you don’t drink a beer. Even if
the absence of sunrise is a remote possibility, its distance from the actual
world does not depend on your beer. Thus, an account based solely on the
Ramsey Test will predict that (11) is true. Instead, an account that combines
the Ramsey Test with the Chrysippus Test will predict that (11) is false.
The latter prediction is exactly what one should expect from the evidential
interpretation: if the consequent of (11) holds, it does not hold in virtue of
its antecedent9.
The hypothesis that emerges from these initial informal remarks is that
‘If A, then C’ is non-vacuously true just in case there is a 10-free sphere in
which A is true in some world and C is false in some world. This account
8 The Ramsey Test comes from Ramsey [26]. Stalnaker [31] and Lewis [22] adopt the modal
interpretation suggested.
9 Douven [8] discusses similar examples.
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of non-vacuous truth, as we shall see, can plausibly be combined with a
standard characterization of vacuous truth. If A is impossible — that is, true
in no world — then there are no 10-worlds at all, so it is unlikely that 10
occurs no matter what C says. Similarly, if C is necessary — that is, true in
every world — then there are no 10-worlds at all, so it is unlikely that 10
occurs no matter what A says.
3 definitions
To phrase in more formal terms what we have just said, we will define
a modal language called L. The symbols of L are the letters p, q, r, ..., the
connectives ∼,⊃,∧,∨, .,,♦, and the brackets (, ). The formulas of L are
defined by induction in the usual way: p, q, r... are formulas; if α is a formula,
∼α,α,♦α are formulas; if α and β are formulas, α ⊃ β, α∧ β, α∨ β, α . β are
formulas. The interpretation of L is based on Lewis’s notion of system of
spheres.
definition 1 Given a non-empty set W, a system of spheres O over W is
an assignment to each w ∈W of a set Ow of non-empty sets of elements of
W — a set of spheres around w — such that:
1. if S ∈ Ow and S′ ∈ Ow, then either S ⊆ S′ or S′ ⊆ S;
2. {w} ∈ Ow;
3. if S 6= ⋃Ow, then there is a S′ such that S ⊂ S′ and S′ ⊆ S′′ for every
S′′ such that S ⊂ S′′.
Clause 1 says that Ow is nested. This condition is essential, otherwise we
would have two spheres S, S′ and two worlds w′, w′′ such that w′ ∈ S but
w′ /∈ S′, and w′′ ∈ S′ but w′′ /∈ S. That is, w′ would be more similar to w
than w′′ and w′′ would be more similar to w than w′.
Clause 2 implies that Ow is centered on w. If {w} ∈ Ow, then by clause
1 we have that, for every S ∈ Ow, {w} ⊆ S, given that S is assumed to be
non-empty. This means that w belongs to every sphere around w. The idea
that underlies centering is that the innermost sphere is a singleton because
no other world is as similar to w as w itself is.
Clause 3 states the limit assumption, according to which, for every sphere
smaller than
⋃
Ow, there is a smallest sphere around S: getting closer and
closer to S we eventually reach a limit. In the specific case in which S = {w},
this means that there is a sphere that contains the worlds closest to w.
Without the limit assumption, we would have infinitely descending chains,
that is, we would have that, no matter how w′ is close to w, there is always
another w′′ such that w′′ is closer to w than w′. Although Lewis finds this
assumption questionable for metaphysical reasons, we think that we can live
with it10.
Further constraints on O might be added. One is closure under union: if
S ⊆ Ow and ⋃ S is the set of all w′ such that w′ belongs to some member of
S, then
⋃
S ∈ Ow. Another is closure under intersection: if S ⊆ Ow and ⋂ S
is the set of all w′ such that w′ belongs to every member of S,
⋂
S ∈ Ow.
A third constraint is uniformity: for every w, w′ ∈ W, ⋃Ow = ⋃Ow′ ;. Since
clause 2 entails that, for every w ∈W, w ∈ ⋃Ow, from the uniformity of O
we get that, for each w ∈W, ⋃Ow = W, that is, every world lies within some
10 Lewis [22], pp. 19-21. Several authors have defended the limit assumptions, see for example
Warmbrod [36] and Diez [7].
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sphere around w. Each of these constraint is reasonable. However, we will
not assume them as part of the definition of O because they are not strictly
necessary for our purposes11.
A model for L is defined in terms of a system of spheres as follows:
definition 2 A modelM for L is an ordered triple 〈W, O, V〉, where W is a
nonempty set, O is a system of spheres over W, and V is a valuation function
such that, for each atomic formula α of L and each w ∈W, V(α, w) ∈ {1, 0}.
The truth of a formula of L in a world w in a model M is defined as
follows:
definition 3
1 If α is atomic, [α]M,w = 1 iff V(α, w) = 1;
2 [∼α]M,w = 1 iff [α]M,w = 0;
3 [α ∧ β]M,w = 1 iff [α]M,w = 1 and [β]M,w = 1;
4 [α ∨ β]M,w = 1 iff either [α]M,w = 1 or [β]M,w = 1;
5 [α ⊃ β]M,w = 1 iff either [α]M,w = 0 or [β]M,w = 1;
6 [α . β]M,w = 1 iff the following conditions hold:
(a) for every w′, if [α]M,w′ = 1 and there are no w′′ and S such that
w′′ ∈ S, w′ /∈ S, and [α]M,w′′ = 1, then [β]M,w′ = 1;
(b) for every w′, if [β]M,w′ = 0 and there are no w′′ and S such that
w′′ ∈ S, w′ /∈ S, and [β]M,w′′ = 0, then [α]M,w′ = 0;
7 [α]M,w = 1 iff, for every w′ in every S ∈ Ow, [α]M,w′ = 1;
8 [♦α]M,w = 1 iff, for some w′ in some S ∈ Ow, [α]M,w′ = 1.
In clause 6, (a) expresses the Ramsey Test, or at least one of the most
widespread understanding of it: β must be true in the closest worlds in
which α is true. (b) expresses the Chrysippus Test: α must be false in the
closest worlds in which β is false. Note that if α is impossible, the antecedent
of (a) is false for every world, and the consequent of (b) is true for every
world. Similarly, if β is necessary, the consequent of (a) is true for every
world, and the antecedent of (b) is false for every world. This means that
α . β is vacuously true when α is impossible or β is necessary. Instead, when
α is true in some world and β is false is some world, (a) entails that there
is a 10-free sphere where α is true in some world, and (b) entails that there
is a 10-free sphere where β is false in some world. Since one of the two
spheres must include the other, there is a sphere that is sufficiently inclusive
in the sense explained. This means that α . β is non-vacuously true when it
is verified by a sufficiently inclusive sphere.
Validity, indicated by the symbol , is defined in terms of truth in a world
w in a modelM:
definition 4  α iff α is true in every world in every model.
Logical consequence is defined accordingly for every finite set of formulas
α1, ..., αn and every formula β:
definition 5 α1, ...αn  β iff  (α1 ∧ ...∧ αn) ⊃ β.
11 Lewis [22], pp. 14-15, 120-121.
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In the following sections we will employ these definitions to prove some
remarkable facts about the evidential interpretation. As we will show, .
differs from ⊃ exactly in the way we would like it to differ from ⊃.
4 some relatively uncontroversial principles
Although it is commonly taken for granted that conditionals as they are
used in ordinary language do not behave in accordance with the material
interpretation, there is little agreement on the nature and the extent of
such deviation. Different non-material accounts of conditionals tend to
privilege different intuitions, and there is no obvious answer to the question
of which of them is the correct one. However, this does not mean that
the logical principles that hold for ⊃ are all equally controversial. Some
of these principles are widely accepted as sound, and hold in most non-
material interpretations. Others are highly controversial, and fail in most
non-material interpretations. In between, there are principles which are
neither clearly controversial nor clearly uncontroversial, as they hold in some
non-material interpretations but fail in others. We will consider each of these
three categories in order to elucidate the logical properties of .. In the proofs
that follow,M is a model 〈W, O, V〉, w is a world inM, and the symbol PL
indicates logical consequence in a classical propositional language.
Let us start with some relatively uncontentious principles that hold for
⊃. The first is Modus Ponens: ‘If A, then C’ and A entail C. This is the
simplest and most fundamental rule of inference involving conditionals, and
most theorists of conditionals agree on its centrality. The evidential account
validates Modus Ponens.
fact 1 α . β, α  β (Modus Ponens X)
Proof. Assume that [α . β]M,w = 1 and [α]M,w = 1. Since there are no w′ and
S such that w′ ∈ S, w /∈ S, and [α]M,w′ = 1, by (a) we get that [β]M,w = 1.
Modus Ponens holds because the combination 10 does not occur in the
worlds that are most similar to the actual world, and the actual world itself
is one of them.
The second principle, Superclassicality, says that ‘If A, then C’ is true
whenever C logically follows from A. The evidential account validates Super-
classicality, as it is reasonable to desire.
fact 2 If α PL β, then  α . β (Superclassicality X)
Proof. Assume that α PL β. Then, for every w, there is no w′ such that
[α]M,w′ = 1 and [β]M,w′ = 0. It follows that (a) and (b) are both satisfied, so
that [α . β]M,w = 1.
Logical consequence may be regarded as the strongest form of support. If
β logically follows from α, then α provides a conclusive reason for accepting
β. Note that a direct corollary of fact 2 is that  α . α, given that α PL α.
Two further principles, which involve the modal operator , are Necessary
Consequent and Impossible Antecedent: ‘If A, then C’ is true when C is necessary
or A is impossible. The evidential account validates these two principles, as
they follow directly from definition 3:
fact 3 α  β . α (Necessary Consequent X)
Proof. Assume that [α]M,w = 1. Then by definition [β . α]M,w = 1.
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fact 4 ∼α  α . β (Impossible Antecedent X)
Proof. Assume that [∼α]M,w = 1. Then by definition [α . β]M,w = 1.
5 some highly controversial principles
Now we will show that the evidential account invalidates some highly
contentious principles that hold for ⊃. In the material interpretation, the
mere falsity of A or the mere truth of C suffices for the truth of ‘If A, then C’,
that is, False Antecedent and True Consequent hold for ⊃. This is commonly
regarded as a reason to doubt the material interpretation. For example, it is
quite implausible that the following sentences are true:
(12) If the Colisseum is in Paris, then I will win the lottery
(13) If the Colisseum is in Paris, then it is in Rome12
. differs from ⊃ in this respect. On the evidential account, (12) and (13)
are false. More generally, the evidential account invalidates False Antecedent
and True Consequent.
fact 5 ∼α 2 α . β (False Antecedent ×)
Proof. Suppose that [α]M,w = 0 and that, for some w′, [α]M,w′ = 1, [β]M,w′ =
0, and w′ ∈ S for every S 6= {w}. In this case [∼α]M,w = 1. But [α . β]M,w =
0, for w′ violates (a).
fact 6 β 2 α . β (True Consequent ×)
Proof. Suppose that [β]M,w = 1 and that, for some w′, [α]M,w′ = 1, [β]M,w′ =
0, and w′ ∈ S for every S 6= {w}. In this case [α . β]M,w = 0, for w′ violates
(b).
A closely related principle that holds for ⊃ is Linearity: for every A and
C, either ‘If A, then C’ or ‘If C, then A’ is true. For example, the following
disjunction is true in the material interpretation:
(14) Either if it is snowing then I will win the lottery or if I will win the
lottery then it is snowing
Again, . differs from ⊃ in this respect. On the evidential account, (14) is false
because in each disjunct the antecedent and the consequent are not related
in the right way. More generally, the evidential account invalidates Linearity.
fact 7 2 (α . β) ∨ (β . α) (Linearity ×)
Proof. Suppose that [α]M,w = 0 and [β]M,w = 0. Let w′ and w′′ be such that
[α]M,w′ = 1, [β]M,w′ = 0, [α]M,w′′ = 0, [β]M,w′′ = 1, and that w′ ∈ S and
w′′ ∈ S for every S 6= {w}. In this case [α . β]M,w = 0 because w′ violates (a).
Moreover, [β . α]M,w = 0 because w′′ violates (a).
Another principle that is closely related to False Antecedent and True
Consequent is Conditional Proof : if A, together with a set of premises, entails
C, then ‘If A, then C’ follows from those premises. If Conditional Proof holds,
the same goes for False Antecedent and True Consequent. This is why the
evidential account does not validate Conditional Proof.
12 Edgington [11], section 2.3, presents False Antecedent and True Consequent as “the best-known
objection to the material account”.
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fact 8 Not: if Γ, α PL β, then Γ  α . β (Conditional Proof ×)
Proof. Conditional Proof fails because it entails False Antecedent and True
Consequent. Suppose that if Γ, α PL β, then Γ  α . β. Since ∼α, α PL β
and β, α PL β, we get that ∼α  α . β and β  α . β, contrary to facts 5 and
6.
Two further properties of the material interpretation are widely regarded
as counterintuitive. One is Monotonicity: ‘If A, then C’ entails ‘If A and B,
then C’. The other is Transitivity: ‘If A, then C’ and ‘If C, then B’ entail ‘If A,
then B’. Examples such as the following, due to Adams, are commonly taken
to show that conditionals as they are used in ordinary language are neither
monotonic nor transitive:
If Brown wins the election, Smith will retire to private life. There-
fore, if Smith dies before the election and Brown wins it, Smith
will retire to private life.
If Brown wins the election, Smith will retire to private life. If
Smith dies before the election, Brown will win it. Therefore, if
Smith dies before the election, then he will retire to private life13.
The evidential account can explain the apparent invalidity of these ar-
guments. It is possible that the premise of the first argument is true but its
conclusion is false, for only the former passes the Ramsey Test. Similarly, it
is possible that the premises of the second argument are true but its conclu-
sion is false, for only the former pass the Ramsey Test. More generally, the
evidential account invalidates Monotonicity and Transitivity.
fact 9 α . γ 2 (α ∧ β) . γ (Monotonicity ×)
Proof. Suppose that [α . γ]M,w = 1 and, for some S, there is no w′ ∈ S
such that [β]M,w′ = 1. Suppose also that outside S there is a w′′ such that
[α]M,w′′ = 1, [β]M,w′′ = 1, [γ]M,w′′ = 0, and w′′ belongs to every S′ bigger
than S. In this case [(α ∧ β) . γ]M,w = 0 because w′′ violates (a).
fact 10 α . β, β . γ 2 α . γ (Transitivity ×)
Proof. Transitivity fails because it entails Monotonicity, given Superclassi-
cality. Suppose that α . β, β . γ  α . γ, and assume that [α . β]M,w = 1.
Since by fact 2 [(α ∧ γ) . α]M,w = 1, from this assumption we get that
[(α ∧ γ) . β]M,w = 1, contrary to fact 9.
6 contraposition and right weakening
The facts outlined in sections 4 and 5 are results on which most non-material
accounts of conditionals tend to converge: Modus Ponens, Superclassicality,
Necessary Consequent, and Impossible Antecedent are widely accepted as
sound, while False Antecedent, True Consequent, Linearity, Monotonicity,
and Transitivity are widely rejected as counterintuitive. The facts outlined in
this section and in the next two, instead, concern principles on which there
is no such agreement. The evidential account crucially differs from other
non-material accounts with respect to these principles.
One fact that deserves attention concerns Contraposition: ‘If A, then C’
entails ‘If not-C, then not-A’. The evidential account validates Contraposition,
13 Adams [1], p. 166.
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so it agrees with the material interpretation in this respect. To illustrate,
consider the inference from (1) to (15):
(15) If it will shrink, then it is not pure cashmere
This inference seems valid, and the same goes for similar inferences that
involve (2) and (3) as premises. More generally, the evidential account
validates Contraposition.
fact 11 α . β  ∼β .∼α (Contraposition X)
Proof. Assume that [α . β]M,w = 1. Then (a), for every w′, if [α]M,w′ = 1
and there are no w′′ and S such that w′′ ∈ S, w′ /∈ S, and [α]M,w′′ = 1, then
[β]M,w′ = 1, and (b) for every w′, if [β]M,w′ = 0 and there are no w′′ and S
such that w′′ ∈ S, w′ /∈ S, and [β]M,w′′ = 0, then [α]M,w′ = 0. (a) and (b) are
respectively (b) and (a) for ∼β .∼α. Therefore, [∼β .∼α]M,w = 1.
This fact is a distinctive feature of the evidential account. Unlike the
principles considered in the previous two sections, Contraposition is neither
widely accepted nor widely rejected. Some theorists of conditionals regard it
as counterintuitive. Here is an example due to Stalnaker:
‘If the US halts the bombing, then North Vietnam will not agree
to negotiate’. A person would believe that this statement is true if
he thought that the North Vietnamese were determined to press
for a complete withdrawal of US troops. But he would surely
deny the contrapositive, ‘If North Vietnam agrees to negotiate,
then the US will not have halted the bombing’14.
However, these examples can hardly prove that Contraposition fails in
the evidential interpretation. As has been noted by Lycan, Bennett and
others, the alleged counterexamples to Contraposition typically involve a
concessive reading of the premise15. Therefore, they loose their grip on any
interpretation which rules out such a reading. This is precisely the case of
the evidential interpretation: a conditional is true in the evidential sense only
if it is false in the concessive sense. Thus, a conditional that is true solely
in the concessive sense, such as ‘If the US halts the bombing, then North
Vietnam will not agree to negotiate’, is false in the evidential account. Note
that this conditional, unlike (1), does not pass the Chrysippus Test, for it is
not the case that the closest worlds in which North Vietnam will agree to
negotiate are worlds in which the US keep bombing. If North Vietnam will
not agree to negotiate, it is not because the US halts the bombing, but rather
in spite of that fact. More generally, insofar as the alleged counterexamples
to Contraposition involve a concessive reading of the premise, they do not
work in the evidential interpretation because their premise turns out to be
false on that interpretation.
A closely related fact concerns Right Weakening, the principle according
to which if B logically follows from C, ‘If A, then C’ entails ‘If A, then B’.
Right Weakening holds for ⊃. However, it does not hold for .. To see why,
consider the following example, taken from Rott:
It makes perfect sense to say ‘If you pay an extra fee, your letter
will be delivered by express’, because the fee will buy you a
special service. But it sounds odd to say ‘If you pay an extra
14 Stalnaker [31], p. 39.
15 Lycan [23], p. 34, Bennett [3], pp. 32 and 143-144.
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fee, your letter will be delivered’, because the letter would be
delivered anyway, even if you did not pay the extra fee16.
In the evidential interpretation, the first conditional is plausibly true. Very
likely, if your letter will be delivered by express, it is because you paid the
extra fee. The fulfilment of the Chrysippus Test is key here: among the
worlds in which your letter will not be delivered by express, those in which
you did not pay the extra fee are closer than those in which you paid it.
However, the second conditional may easily be false: it is not in virtue of
the payment of the extra fee that your letter will be delivered. Arguably,
this conditional does not pass the Chrysippus Test: there is no reason to
think that, among the worlds in which your letter is not delivered at all,
those in which you did not pay the extra fee are closer than those in which
you paid it. The closest worlds in which the letter is not delivered will
rather have other kinds of features, like the occurrence of some accident, in
virtue of which the delivery failed altogether, regardless of your payment
of the extra fee. Therefore, the second conditional does not follow from the
first. And since the consequent of the first — once naturally formalized in a
propositional language — entails the consequent of the second, this shows
that the evidential account invalidates Right Weakening.
The failure of Right Weaking can be proved in more general terms as
follows:
fact 12 Not: if β PL γ, then α . β  α . γ (Right Weakening ×)
Proof. Right Weakening fails because it entails Monotonicity, given Contra-
position. If it were the case that, if β PL γ, then α . β  α . γ, from the
assumption that [α > γ]M,w = 1 we would get that [(α ∧ β) . γ]M,w = 1,
contrary to fact 9. The reason is that α . γ entails ∼γ > ∼α by fact 11, and
∼α PL ∼α ∨ ∼β. By fact 11 ∼γ . (∼α ∨ ∼β) entails ∼(∼α ∨ ∼β) .∼∼γ,
which is logically equivalent to (α ∧ β) > γ.
This proof shows the connection between Contraposition and Right Weak-
ening: if Monotonicity fails, then either Contraposition or Right Weakening
must fail as well. This is why facts 11 and 12 are closely related.
7 conditional excluded middle and conjunctive sufficiency
One rather debated principle that holds for ⊃ is Conditional Excluded Middle:
for every A and C, either ‘If A, then C’ or ‘If A, then not-C’ is true. Some non-
material accounts of conditionals preserve this principle, while others deny
it. The key question is whether ‘Not: if A, then C’ entails ‘If A, then not-C’.
If it does, then Conditional Excluded Middle straightforwardly follows from
Excluded Middle, according to which either ‘If A, then C’ or ‘Not: if A, then
C’ is true, otherwise it does not follow.
The evidential account invalidates Conditional Ecluded Middle. Consider
the following sentences:
(16) If planet nine exists, then the EU will collapse within 5 years
(17) If planet nine exists, then the EU will not collapse within 5 years
Since the existence of planet nine and the collapse of the EU are totally
unrelated, (16) and (17) are both false, so the same goes for the disjunction
16 Rott [28], p. 6.
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of (16) and (17). More generally, ∼(α . β) does not entail α .∼β, so (α . β) ∨
(α .∼β) does not follow from (α . β) ∨∼(α . β).
fact 13 2 (α . β) ∨ (α .∼β) (Conditional Excluded Middle ×)
Proof. Suppose that [α]M,w = 1 and [β]M,w = 0. Let w′ be such that
[α]M,w′ = 1, [β]M,w′ = 1, and w′ ∈ S for every S 6= {w}. In this case
[α . β]M,w = 0 because w violates both (a) and (b). Moreover, [α .∼β]M,w =
0, for w′ violates (b).
A related principle that holds for ⊃ but not for . is Conjunctive Sufficiency:
‘A and C’ entails ‘If A, then C’. Even supposing that the antecedent and the
consequent of (16) are both true, it does not follow that (16) is true. The same
goes for (17). We take the failure of Conjunction Sufficiency to be a plausible
result. If A and C are totally unrelated, it is definitely false that A provides a
reason to accept C, or that if C holds, it holds in virtue of A.
fact 14 α ∧ β 2 α . β (Conjunctive Sufficiency ×)
Proof. Suppose that [α]M,w = 1, [β]M,w = 1, and for some w′, [α]M,w′ = 1,
[β]M,w′ = 0, and w′ ∈ S for every S 6= {w}. In this case [α ∧ β]M,w = 1. But
[α . β]M,w = 0, for w′ violates (b).
Conjunctive Sufficiency is related to Conditional Excluded Middle in the
following way. If ‘Not: if A, then C’ entails ‘If A, then not-C’, as required in
order to derive Conditional Excluded Middle from Excluded Middle, then
Conjunction Sufficiency holds. On the assumption that ‘A and C’ is true, the
supposition that ‘Not: if A, then C’ is true leads to a contradiction if it entails
‘If A, then not-C’, so its negation follows by reductio, which is equivalent to
‘If A, then C’. Therefore, since Conjunction Sufficiency fails for ., the same
must hold for Conditional Excluded Middle.
Leaving aside the relation between Conjunctive Sufficiency and Condi-
tional Excluded Middle, fact 14 is particularly interesting because it shows
that a principled distinction can be drawn between two claims that are usu-
ally conflated. One is centering, understood as a condition on the system
of spheres based on a metaphysical assumption. The other is Conjunctive
Sufficiency, the logical rule just discussed. In the semantic framework offered
by Lewis, if one assumes centering, one gets Conjunctive Sufficiency. As
Lewis himself suggests, one can avoid this result by replacing centering
with a weaker condition, weak centering, that is, by replacing clause 2 of
definition 1 with the conditiont that w belongs to every sphere around w,
without requiring that the innermost sphere is a singleton17. This is why in
the literature on conditionals it is quite common to talk about Conjunction
Sufficiency and centering as if they were the same thing. However, this
coincidence breaks down in our semantic framework: even if one assumes
centering, as in definition 1, one does not get Conjunctive Sufficiency. This
shows clearly that the question whether Conjunction Sufficiency holds does
not reduce to the choice between centering and weak centering.
8 connexivity
The last four principles that we will consider have been extensively discussed
in relation to connexive logics. Connexive logics are characterized by two
main theses which do not hold for ⊃. One is Aristotle’s Thesis: for every A,
17 Lewis [22], p. 29
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‘Not: if A, then not-A’ is true. The other is Boethius’s Thesis: ‘If A, then C’
entails ‘Not: if A, then not-C’. Some connexivists have suggested that what
is needed to validate Aristotle’s Thesis and Boethius’ Thesis is a suitable
reading of Chrysippus’ claim that a conditional is true when the negation of
its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent18.
Although we doubt that Aristotle’s thesis and Boethius’ thesis hold unre-
strictedly, we believe that the idea of connexivity rests on a solid intuition,
and that to some extent it is plausible that this intuition goes back to Chrysip-
pus. Consider the following sentence:
(18) If it is snowing, then it is not snowing
It is quite natural to think that there is something wrong in (18). In the
material interpretation, however, (18) true when it is not snowing, so our
negative reaction can be correct only if it is snowing. This is an odd thing to
say. The impression of falsity that we get when we look at (18) has nothing to
do with the weather. If we feel that there is something wrong in (18), it is not
because we look out the window. It seems that (18) is false no matter whether
it is snowing. So we find plausible to say that what makes (18) false is that
the negation of its consequent is patently compatible with its antecedent.
This is not to say that every conditional of the form ‘If A, then not-A’ is
intuitively false. For example, we have no clear intuitions about (19):
(19) If it is not the case that either it is snowing or it is not snowing, then
either it is snowing or it is not snowing
More generally, when A is impossible, it is reasonable to think that ‘If A,
then not-A’ is vacuously true. This is why we doubt that ‘Not: if A, then
not-A’ is always true.
The same goes for Boethius’ thesis. For example, it is plausible that if (3)
is true, then (20) is false:
(20) If it is snowing, then it is not cold
But it is not obvious that the same holds for any two conditionals of the same
form. For example, it is reasonable to think that (21) and (22) are both true:
(21) If it is snowing and it is not snowing, then it is snowing
(22) If it is snowing and it is not snowing, then it is not snowing
More generally, we think that Aristotle’s thesis and Boethius’ thesis are
plausible only insofar as they entail two weaker claims which may be called
Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis and Restricted Boethius’ Thesis: if A is possible, then
‘Not: if A, then not-A’ is true, and if A is possible, then ‘If A, then C’ entails
‘Not: if A, then not-C’19.
Similar considerations hold for a third connexivist thesis, Abelard’s Thesis,
according to which ‘If A, then C’ entails ‘Not: if not-A, then C’20. Consider
the following sentence:
(23) If it is not pure cashmere, it will not shrink
18 McCall [24] and Wansing [35] suggest that the idea of connexivity go back to Chrysippus. The
relation of inconsistency defined in Nelson [25] has been taken to provde such a reading.
19 This is essentially the point made in Iacona [16]. Restricted versions of connexive principles are
also considered in Lenzen [21], Kapsner [19], and Unterhuber [32].
20 See Estrada Gonza´les and Ramı´rez-Ca´mara [12], pp. 346-348.
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It makes perfect sense to think that if (1) is true, then (23) is false. However,
there are cases in which two conditionals of this form may reasonably be
regarded as true:
(24) If it is snowing, then either it is snowing or it is not snowing
(25) If it is not snowing, then either it is snowing or it is not snowing
More generally, we think that Abelard’s thesis is plausible only insofar as
it entails a weaker principle, Restricted Abelard’s Thesis: if C is not necessary,
then ‘If A, then C’ entails ‘Not: if not-A, then C’.
The evidential interpretation behaves exactly as we would expect. First,
(18) is false because it is trivially not the case that the worlds in which it
is snowing are more distant from the actual world than those in which it
is snowing and not snowing. Instead, (19) is vacuously true because its
antecedent is impossible. Second, if (3) is true, then (20) is false: if it is
cold in the closest worlds in which it is snowing, it cannot be warm in such
worlds. Instead, (21) and (22) are vacuously true because its antecedent is
impossible. Third, if (1) is true, then (23) is false, because it is impossible that
both (1) and (23) pass the Chrysippus Test: if the closest worlds in which it
will shrink are worlds in which it is not pure cashmere, it cannot be the case
that the closest worlds in which it will shrink are worlds in which it is pure
cashmere. Instead, (24) and (25) are vacuously true because their consequent
is necessary.
Now we will prove that Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis, Restricted Boethius’
Thesis, and Restricted Abelard’s Thesis hold for .. In order to do so, we will
prove a stronger principle, Restricted Selectivity21:
fact 15 If β PL ∼γ, then ♦α, α . β  ∼(α . γ) (Restricted Selectivity X)
Proof. Assume that β PL ∼γ, [♦α]M,w = 1, and [α . β]M,w = 1. Since
[♦α]M,w = 1, α is true in some worlds. Since [α . β]M,w = 1, for every
w′ such that [α]M,w′ = 1 and there are no w′′ and S such that w′′ ∈ S,
w′ /∈ S, and [α]M,w′′ = 1, then [β]M,w′ = 1. Since β PL ∼γ, it follows that
[∼γ]M,w′ = 1. So [γ]M,w′ = 0. Therefore, [α . γ]M,w = 0, and consequently
[∼(α . γ)]M,w = 1.
fact 16 ♦α, α . β  ∼(α .∼β) (Restricted Boethius’ Thesis X)
Proof. This follows directly from Restricted Selectivity. Assume that [♦α]M,w =
1 and [α . β]M,w = 1. Since β PL ∼∼β, by fact 15 [∼(α .∼β)]M,w = 1.
fact 17 ♦α  ∼(α .∼α) (Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis X)
Proof. This follows from Restricted Boethius’ Thesis, given Superclassicality.
Assume that [♦α]M,w = 1. Since [α . α]M,w = 1 by fact 2, it follows by fact
16 that [∼(α .∼α)]M,w = 1.
fact 18 ♦∼β, α . β  ∼(∼α . β) (Restricted Abelard’s Thesis X)
Proof. This follows from Resticted Selectivity, given Contraposition. Assume
that [♦∼β]M,w = 1 and [α . β]M,w = 1. By fact 11 the latter entails that
[∼β .∼α]M,w = 1. So, by fact 15 [∼(∼β . α)]M,w = 1, given that ∼α PL ∼α.
This means that [∼β . α]M,w = 0. But if so, [∼α . β]M,w = 0 as well, for
∼β . α and ∼α . β have the same truth conditions (switch (a) and (b) as in
the proof of fact 11). Therefore, [∼(∼α . β)]M,w = 1.
21 See Huber [14], p. 531.
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9 comparisons
Sections 4-8 show some important logical properties of .. These properties
characterize the evidential interpretation as distinct from other interpre-
tations. The first thing that must be noted is that, in terms of strength,
the evidential interpretation lies between the strict interpretation and the
material interpretation: (α ⊃ β) entails α . β, and α . β entails α ⊃ β.
fact 19 (α ⊃ β)  α . β (Strict to Evidential X)
Proof. Assume that [(α ⊃ β)]M,w = 1. Then, for every w′, if [α]M,w′ =
1, then [β]M,w′ = 1, and for every w′, if [β]M,w′ = 0, then [α]M,w′ = 0.
Therefore, [α . β]M,w = 1.
fact 20 α . β  α ⊃ β (Evidential to Material X)
Proof. Assume that [α . β]M,w = 1. Then, for some S, there is no w′ ∈ S such
that [α]M,w′ = 1 and [β]M,w′ = 0. Since w ∈ S, [α ⊃ β]M,w = 1.
The evidential interpretation differs from the strict interpretation in that
it invalidates Monotonicity and Transitivity, as we saw in section 5. So there
is a clear sense in which the evidential interpretation is weaker than the strict
interpretation22.
A second and more interesting point is that the evidential interpreta-
tion significantly differs from the suppositional interpretation advocated by
Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others. In the suppositional interpretation, a
conditional means that its consequent is credible enough given its antecedent.
That is, on the supposition that its antecedent holds, there are good chances
that its consequent holds. Just as the evidential interpretation, the supposi-
tional interpretation lies between the strict interpretation and the material
interpretation. But it is weaker than the evidential interpretation: if a condi-
tional is true in the evidential sense, then it is true in the suppositional sense,
but not the other way round. Truth in the suppositional sense is defined
solely in terms of the Ramsey Test, so it holds no matter whether Chrysippus
Test is satisfied.
The relation between the evidential interpretation and the suppositional
interpretation can be expressed more precisely by adopting the symbol⇒ for
the latter interpretation, that is, by assuming that, for any two formulas α, β,
any model M, and any world w, [α ⇒ β]M,w = 1 if and only if condition
(a) of clause 6 of definition 3 is satisfied. On this assumption, we have the
following equivalence:
fact 21 [α . β]M,w = 1 iff [(α⇒ β) ∧ (∼ β⇒∼ α)]M,w = 1
Proof. Assume that [α . β]M,w = 1. Since (a) holds for α and β, [α ⇒
β]M,w = 1. Since (b) holds for α and β, (a) holds for ∼ β and ∼ α, hence
[∼ β ⇒∼ α]M,w = 1. Therefore, [(α ⇒ β) ∧ (∼ β ⇒∼ α)]M,w = 1. The
proof of the right-to-left direction is similar.
Fact 21 shows that . is definable in terms of⇒. The opposite is also true,
although less trivial, that is,⇒ is definable in terms of ..23
22 Influential analyses of non-material monotonic conditionals have been sometimes integrated in
so-called dynamic semantics. A thorough comparison with these approaches would reveal even
more divergences from ours. For instance, in Veltman?s theory, presented in Veltman [34], True
Consequent is valid while Modus Tollens is not.
23 An advanced analysis of the mutual definability of different kinds of conditional can be found
in Raidl [?].
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fact 22 [α⇒ β]M,w = 1 iff [(α . β)∨ (α∧ β)∨ ((α∨ ∼ β) . (α∧ β))]M,w = 1
Proof. Assume that [(α . β) ∨ (α ∧ β) ∨ ((α∨ ∼ β) . (α ∧ β))]M,w = 1. Then
at least one of the three disjuncts is true. If [α . β]M,w = 1, then (a) holds
by definition, so [α ⇒ β]M,w = 1. If [α ∧ β]M,w = 1, then w verifies both
the antecedent and the consequent of (a), while every other world falsifies
its antecedent. Therefore, [α ⇒ β]M,w = 1. Finally, suppose that [(α∨ ∼
β . (α ∧ β)]M,w = 1. Then, by (a) either α∨ ∼ β is impossible, or the closest
worlds in which α∨ ∼ β is true are worlds in which α and β are both true. In
the first case α is impossible, so [α⇒ β]M,w = 1. In the second case, consider
any w′ such that [α]M,w′ = 1 and there are no w′′ and S such that w′′ ∈ S,
w′ /∈ S, and [α]M,w′′ = 1. In this case, [α∨ ∼ β]M,w′ = 1. Moreover, there are
no w′′′ and S such that w′′′ ∈ S, w′ /∈ S, and [α∨ ∼ β]M,w′′′ = 1, otherwise
we would not have that the closest worlds in which α∨ ∼ β is true are worlds
in which α is true. Since w′ belongs to the closest worlds in which α∨ ∼ β is
true, and β is true in such worlds, [β]M,w′ = 1. Therefore, [α⇒ β]M,w = 1.
Now assume that [α⇒ β]M,w = 1. If α is impossible, then [α . β]M,w = 1,
hence [(α . β) ∨ (α ∧ β) ∨ ((α∨ ∼ β) . (α ∧ β))]M,w = 1. If [α]M,w = 1,
then [α ∧ β]M,w = 1, which entails that [(α . β) ∨ (α ∧ β) ∨ ((α∨ ∼ β) . (α ∧
β))]M,w = 1. So we are left with the case in which [α]M,w = 0 and α is true
in some world other than w. In this case, either [β]M,w = 0 or [β]M,w = 1. If
[β]M,w = 0, then (b) holds for α and β, so [α . β]M,w = 1, and consequently
[(α . β)∨ (α∧ β)∨ ((α∨ ∼ β) . (α∧ β))]M,w = 1. If [β]M,w = 1, then again it
may happen that (b) holds for α and β, for it may be the case that the closest
worlds in which β is false are worlds in which α is false. Leaving aside that
possibility, we get that both (a) and (b) hold for α∨ ∼ β and α ∧ β. (a) holds
for α∨ ∼ β and α∧ β for the following reason: since (a) holds for α and β, the
closest worlds in which α∨ ∼ β is true cannot be worlds in which α is true
and β is false, and since (b) does not hold for α and β, the closest worlds in
which α∨ ∼ β is true cannot be worlds in which α and β are both false; so the
closest worlds in which α∨ ∼ β is true must be worlds in which α and β are
both true. (b) holds for α∨ ∼ β and α ∧ β because α∨ ∼ β is false in w, the
closest world in which α ∧ β is false. Therefore, [(α∨ ∼ β) . (α ∧ β)]M,w = 1,
and consequently [(α . β) ∨ (α ∧ β) ∨ ((α∨ ∼ β) . (α ∧ β))]M,w = 1.
The difference between the evidential interpretation and the supposi-
tional interpretation emerges clearly if we consider the principles discussed
in sections 6-8. As explained in section 6, the evidential interpretation val-
idates Contraposition. The examples that are usually taken to show that
Contraposition fails, such as the inference about the US and North Vietnam,
typically include concessive conditionals as premises, so they do not work if
conditionals are understood evidentially. Concessive conditionals are false
in the evidential sense because they do not pass the Chrysippus Test. By
contrast, the suppositional interpretation invalidates Contraposition. The
same examples work if conditionals are understood suppositionally, for their
premises turn out to be true. Concessive conditionals may be described as
conditionals that are true just in case they are true in the suppositional sense
but not in the evidential sense24.
Right Weakening produces opposite results: while the evidential inter-
pretation invalidates it, the suppositional interpretation validates it. The
examples that can rightfully be taken to show that Right Weakening fails,
such as the inference about the letter, work only if conditionals are under-
stood evidentially. In the evidential understanding, the conclusions of such
24 This is in line with the analysis of “even if” suggested in Douven [9], p. 119.
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inferences are false because it does not pass the Chrysippus Test. Instead, the
same examples do not work if conditionals are understood suppositionally,
for their conclusions turn out to be true.
As explained in section 7, the evidential interpretation invalidates Condi-
tional Excluded Middle and Conjunctive Sufficiency. The schema ‘Either if
A then C, or if A then not-C’ has apparently false instances which involve
violation of the Chrysippus Test, and the inference from ‘A and C’ to ‘If A,
then C’ seems invalid for the same reason. The suppositional interpretation
differs with respect to both principles. Although its core idea — Ramsey’s
original idea — by itself does not entail Conditional Excluded Middle, and
can be developed in the way suggested by Lewis, a natural reading of that
idea accords perfectly well with Conditional Excluded Middle: to say that
C does not hold on the supposition that A holds is to say that not-C holds
on that supposition, so if ‘If A, then C’ is false, ‘If A, then not-C’ must be
true. This is the reading adopted by Adams and Stalnaker. The suppositional
interpretation also validates Conjunctive Sufficiency: if A and C actually
hold, then it is obviously the case that there are good chances that C holds
on the supposition that A holds.
Finally, the evidential interpretation validates Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis,
Restricted Boethius’ Thesis, and Restricted Abelard’s Thesis. The supposi-
tional interpretation agrees with it on the first two theses, but it crucially
differs with respect to the third. Again, the crux is Chrysippus Test. Consider
(11). Since (11) is acceptable in the suppositional sense, if we replace its
antecedent with ‘You don’t drink a beer’ we obtain a conditional which is
also acceptable in the suppositional sense: there are good chances that its
consequent holds on the supposition that its antecedent holds.
Not only the account outlined in this paper differs from the suppositional
theories of conditionals in the way explained, but it also differs in important
respects from some recent attempts to provide a non-monotonic theory of
conditionals based on the notion of support. One is Rott’s treatment of
“difference-making” conditionals, which adopts a strengthened version of the
Ramsey Test in the context of the classical theory of belief revision. Rott’s
account, like ours, invalidates Monotonicity and Right Weakening. Unlike
ours, however, it does not retain Contraposition, even though Contraposition
is consistent with the rejection of Monotonicity, provided that Right Weaken-
ing fails. This result has no obvious intuitive rationale. Once the concessive
reading of ‘if then’ is ruled out, and the alleged counterexamples such as
that considered in section 6 loose their grip, it is no longer clear what reason
one may have for rejecting Contraposition25.
The other example is Douven’s epistemic analysis of conditionals, which
relies on a notion of evidential support defined in terms of degrees of
belief. Douven’s account yields a considerably weak logic, in which several
widely accepted principles, including Modus Ponens, turn out to be invalid.
Therefore, it significantly differs from our account, which preserves Modus
Ponens and other basic principles26.
10 truth and assertibility
In this paper we have pursued a truth-conditional approach to conditionals,
that is, we have defined the evidential interpretation by specifying the
conditions under which a conditional is true on that interpretation. More
25 Rott [28].
26 Douven [9], ch. 5.
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specifically, truth has been defined relative to worlds, as in any standard
modal language. Accordingly, the notion of logical consequence adopted to
illustrate the logical features of the evidential account is also standard.
This is not the only possibility, however. As is well known, an alternative
route is available, whereby truth conditions are deliberately avoided, and
logical principles are derived from the notion of assertibility. This is the
route followed by Adams in his influential work on conditionals. According
to Adams, ‘If A, then C’ is assertible to the extent that the probability of C
conditional on A is high. In this analysis, the degree of assertibility of ‘If
A, then C’ relative to a probability distribution P is thus P(C|A), and the
corresponding degree of “uncertainty” is 1 minus the degree of assertibility.
Apart from specific limitations in the expressive power of the underlying
language, the logic of the suppositional interpretation is then preserved
in the assertibility approach provided that a valid inference is defined as
having the sum of the uncertainties of the premises as an upper bound for
the uncertainty of the conclusion under any probability assignment27.
Adams’s account of the assertability of a conditional offers a plausible
interpretation of the Ramsey Test. The idea of our Chrysippus test, however,
is not conveyed by this approach. In fact, a very high assertibility of ‘If
A, then C’ is compatible with a comparably high probability of A given
not-C, as illustrated by the case of (11). So it seems that a conditional can be
highly assertible even if the negation of its consequent is not at odds with its
antecedent in a most natural sense. All this is standard and well received in
the literature, especially among authors who — unlike us — are skeptical
either about possible worlds or about the very idea of truth as applied to
conditionals28. More generally, the logic of the suppositional interpretation
largely survives across the divide between accounts based on truth versus
assertibility conditions, and this is quite rightly taken as a sign of the strength
of that interpretation. It is then an interesting question whether something
similar can be said with respect to the evidential intepretation.
Interestingly, this is indeed the case. The key point is to give an analogue
representation of the assertibility of a conditional. For the limiting cases
where P(C) = 1 or P(A) = 0, the default option is to follow Adams again
and posit the assertibility of ‘If A, then C’ to be (vacuously) maximal (i.e.,
1). Besides, earlier work in the probabilistic analysis of evidential support
supplies an effective solution for the more interesting cases where P(C) < 1
and P(A) > 0, namely, equating the degree of assertibility of ‘If A, then C’
given a certain probability distribution P with
P(C|A)− P(C)
1− P(C)
if P(C|A) ≥ P(C) > 0, and 0 otherwise. Intuitively, this is a measure
of the proportion of the initial uncertainty of C (that is, 1− P(C)) that is
cancelled by the upward jump (if any) of the probability of C due to A (that
is, P(C|A)− P(C))29. So ‘If A, then C’ turns out to be at least minimally
assertible only if the supposition of A increases the probability of C. Crucially,
this account of the assertibility of ‘If A, then C’ does combine the ideas of the
Ramsey and the Chrysippus test. Here is why. Suppose that the assertibility
of ‘If A, then C’ relative to P is higher than a given threshold value, say,
higher than 0.8. Then, on very mild background assumptions, one can prove
27 Adams [1], Adams [2].
28 For example Kahle [18], or Edgington [10].
29 See Crupi and Tentori [5], and Crupi and Tentori [6].
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both that the probability of C given A is also higher than 0.8 and that the
probability of A given not-C is lower than 1− 0.8 = 0.2. So a high degree
of assertibility of ‘If A, then C’ as just defined implies both that C is highly
probable given A and that not-C makes A improbable, thus being at odds
with it.
Once the assertibility of an evidential conditional is characterized in
probabilistic terms, one can apply Adams’s idea of validity and check what
logical principles are thus validated. In an extended investigation along this
lines, we have shown that the resulting logic implies exactly the same pattern
of validities and invalidities derived from our truth-conditional discussion
above30. So the evidential interpretation is similar to the suppositional
interpretation in this important respect: its specific logical behaviour is
robust across alternative frameworks and can be motivated even without the
modal apparatus employed here.
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